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CommissionMonetary organization
of the Community
Economic and monetary union is to he estab-
lished in the Community by 31 December
1980. This commitment was entered into by
the Council in its Resolution of 22 March
1971 and reaffirmed by the Heads of State or
Government at the meeting they held in Paris
in October 1972.
Economic and monetary union means in partic-
ular that the Community must from a single
monetary entity within the international
system, characterized by the total and irreversi-
ble convertibility of its currencies, the abolition
of margins of fluctuation for its exchaD:ge ra~es
the fixing of irrevocable parity relatIOnshIps
which is essential to the creation of a single
currency, and involving a Community-level
organization of Central Banks which should
assist in attaining the objectives of stability and
growth in the Community.
third of the time fixed for attaining the
objectives of economic and monetary union has
already passed and if the plan is to be seen
through on time, measures must be taken to
translate political declarations rapidly into con-
crete acts.
With the member countries' economies opening
up to each other and becoming highly interde-
pendent it is more and more urgent for an
independent monetary system to be set up
involving fixed but adjustable parities. In the
enlarged Community, the main share of com-
mercial and financial transactions is between
Member States .and this share is constantly
growing. The cohesion and well-being. of the
Member States are very largely dependent '
secure exchange rate relationships in these trans-
actions. This is all the more important as
for a number of years, the international mone-
tary system has been shaken by deep and
repeated crises which seriously jeopardize the
economic unification process between the
member countries. Attempts are being made
S. 12/73
to  reform ,the.. monetary system . and the
Community is using all its influence to help
towards this reform, but it still cannot be said
how much time will be ne~ded , and Wl1at
shape the reform will take. The Community
cannot go on enduring the uncertainty and the
dangers this presents for further integration,. as
regards, in particular, the development of exter-
nal trade or the. establishment of a European
capital market. The creation of a stable and
lasting monetary system is just as important
for making the necessary progress in other
spheres of Community activities.
Community. system of Central Banks can
only be arrived at progressively by increasing in
successive stages the role played by the Mone-
tary Cooperation Fund which is the embryonic
form of this system. In fact the Commission
feels that the objectives set for 1980 are such
that a basic structure must be created imme-
diately and be substantial enough to enable
them to be achieved by the agreed date. This
is the line taken by proposals that the Commis-
sion outlines in this report in accordance with
the mandate it received: progressive pooling of
foreign exchange, improvement of credit
machinery with a stronger accent being laid on
its Community nature, strengthening of the
coordination of domestic monetary policies,
Community watching brief on exchange rate
policies, joint action on international monetary
rdations. In brief, the main proposals are as follows: 
(i) Extension of the tasks of the Monetary
Cooperation Fund with the gradual pooling of
reserves beginning with. an inital contribution
of 20 % on 1 January 1974, to finish with all
reServes pooled in 1980; 
(ii). Improvement of credit machinery so that
there are uninterrupted credit facilities ranging
from automatic short-term loans to longer-
term loans with specific economic policy condi-
tions attached;
In the absence of effective coordination of eco-
nomic policies this structure might seem fragile.
The Commission already stressed this prob-
lem in, its communication concerning thesecond ,stage, and proposed solutions concern-
ing,  inter alia~  the adoption of additional mea-
sures concerning the coordination of monetary
policies and concerning exchange rate policies.
Based on a number of new measures and
achievements extending throughout economic
policy, the economic and monetary union must
be the result of growing integration and solida-
rity between Member States and will clear the
path for the European Union. Progress
towards the creation of the Community s own
monetary system is an expression of Commu-
nity solidarity; it is a sign of the increasing
unity of the Member States' economies , policies
and objectives. This monetary system is at the
same time a reflection of the need for the
Community to ensure it acts as a single entity
on the international economic scene and of its
will to speak with one voice.
1. The Community s monetary organization
, at present, made up of various elements
which do not fit together very well.
The principal feature of that organization 
known as the 'Community' s band of fluctua-
tion' within which the widest possible margin
between two Community currencies is .limited
at any given moment to 2.25 %. Intervention
must be effected by the issuing authorities of
the currencies at either .extreme of this margin.
These transactions are financed on an 'interim
basis under a system of very short-term
credit (30 days-end of month), with no limits
on amounts. Observance of the fluctuation
margins may require substantial intervention
for which the means of financing must be
automatically available. Upon expiry of the
time limit, the debtor central bank may either
arrange for short-term monetary support to
take over from very short-term credit, by ini-
tiating the procedure under the Agreeement
between Central Banks of 9 February 1970, or
settle the debt by transferring assets in accor-
dance with the composition of its reserves.
Organizing the system whereby one form of
credit takes over from the other is marle
extremely complex because both work on a
basically bilateral basis. Furthermore, the
working of both systems has been strongly
impeded by the following difficulties:
(a)  The short-term monetary support mecha-
nism was worked out at a time when the dollar
was the only intervention currency on the ex-
change markets; the procedures for operating
it are the.refore no longer entirely appropriate to
present circumstances in which the dollar is not
convertible.
(b)  The limits placed on the credits available
under the system, as regards both the amounts
and the duration2 reduce the clearing possibili-
ties between credit and debit positions.
(c)  Finally, these settlement operations have
run into increasing difficulties. The debtor
central banks have shown more and more reluc-
tance to hand over gold reserves at an official
price which diverges considerably from the
market price; the opposite attitude has been
adopted as regard settlements in dollars. 
palliate these difficulties increasingly compli-
cated techniques of keeping accounts separate
have been worked out.
When first considering the development of the
Community monetary system, it was thought
that the Community credit system should be
adjusted by merging the credit facilities
described above within overhauled machinery,
to be followed by the progressive pooling of
reserves. But while an 'adjustment of credit
arrangements , both in volume and duration
would help improve clearing, it would still fail
1 The quotas are as follows: Germany, France, U.
300 million u.a. each; Italy 200 million u.a.; BLEU
and the Netherlands: 100 million u.a. each; Denmark:
45 million u. ; Ireland: 17.5 million u.a. Subject to
the approval of the Committee of Governors of the
Central Banks, the borrowing facilities of each central
bank, which would normally be limited to its quota,
may be extended up to anal1lount corresponding to
the total quotas, that is, 1 362.5 million u.
:I Utilization of the facilities within a maximum of one
month, duration of credit three months, renewable
once.
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the bilateral bias of the credit mechanisms and
from the complex nature of the settlement
methods, itself due to the heterogeneity of. the
assets transferred.
Furthermore, intervention in dollars has always
been kept outside the :system of interim financ-
ing, clearing and settlement. It would not be
desirable to maintain this attitude. The possi-
bility of action having to be taken on the
exchange rates of Community currencies
against the dollar cannot be ruled out com-
pletely, and in such a case the question of the
distribution of risks would inevitably arise.
Besides, the Community s objective in the field
of international monetary relations still is to
return to stable but adjustable parities, and this
would require, when the time arrives, resorting
again to systematic intervention vis-a.-vis the
dollar.
The existing credit mechanisms must thus be
improved so as to enable the Fund to achieve
full multilateralization of all transactions 
the exchange markets. For this objective to be
attained, two essential conditions must be met:
(i) the Fund must be provided with its own
resources which would enable it to act as a
genuine intermediary between creditors and
debtors within the Community and to asume
responsibility for risks arising from interven-
tion in dollars;
(ii) a unit of account must be adopted which
would be used as a means of settlement
between the monetary authorities and as a
reserve instrument.
In other words, the very technique of the pool-
ing of reserves must be adopted.
Finally, the pooling of dollar reserves would
make it easier to consolidate the dollar balan-
ces, generally considered to be one of the main
problems in the reform of the internationa1
monetary system. If part of the dollar balan-
ces were thus in the hands of a single body, the
decisions which the Member States of the
Community are aiming at in this field would
be easier to take. Meanwhile the Fund would
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administer these balances, thus giving concrete
form to the general policy of the Community
as regards the involvement of member coun-
tries in international affairs.
2. This new stage in the monetary organi-
zation of the EEC must not involve the same
risks that other similar Community attempts
have encountered in the past (the system being
generally called into question, individual dero-
gations being applied to interventions and set-
tlements, certain currencies withdrawing from
the Community band). This is why it 
important for the machinery set up to be in 
form which clearly reflects that it is intended
to he permanent and to be imposing enough
to make those involved believe in it.
First of all, it is therefore recommended that
Member States subscribe from their budgets a
capital of 500 million u. , to be paid into the
European Fund. This total would be appor-
tioned between the Member States according
to the scale fixed for short~term monetary
support set up under the Agreement 
9 February 1970. The capital of the Euro-
pean Fund would be subscribed exclusively in
currencies of Community countries. It would
translate the legal personality of the Fund 
financial level and would enable operating
expenditure to be financed from the revenue it
earns.
Two separate formulae should be used for pool-
mg reserves:
(a)  the progressive transfer to the Fund of
official reserves (gold, assets linked to gold and
dollars) accumulated in the past. The initial
contribution could be of the order of 20 % 
the total reserves of the EEC countries, which
would be equivalent toa total in the region of
11 000 million u.a. (on the basis of a total of
Community reserves of 56 000 million u.a. at
the end of March 1973).
1 The scale used in this agreement is the following
(in %): Germany, France, UK: 22.02. each; Italy:
14.68; BLEU and Netherlands: 7.34 each; Denmark:
3.3; Ireland: 11.28.(b)  The surrender to the Fund of reserveS
newly acquired or transferred as a result of
interventions in exchange markets.
The process of pooling should be completed in
1980 by the transfer to the Fund of Member
Sates' total reserves. A fixed time-table could
be laid down for the contributions to be made
in the intervening period; at intervals of
18 months, tor instance, calls could be made
for additional contributions, raising the overall
contribution successively to 40 %, 60 %, etc.
of the total reserves held by the central bank at
the time of pooling. Depending on the
circumstances and on the extent to which eco-
nomic policies have been harmonized, the
Commission could propose to speed up or slow
down the progressive pooling of reserves.
It is necessary to avoid any formula for the
pooling of reserves which would result in this
operation starting out half-hea;redly and
pending merely on the trend which the pay-
ments relationships between Member States
happened to show. This would result if the
method used consisted of pooling only reserves
arising from intervention either in Community
currencies or in dollars. In addition to being
slow to take effect, such an operation could
come up with results which were distinctly
unequal as between the countries contributing to
the pooling of reserves or between the assets
built up in this way.
At present, and as long as the problem of. the
price of gold has not been settled, the contnbu-
tion of this reserve asset poses a problem of
evaluation. But it is not advisable to pool
reserves without including gold, for the opera-
tion would then lose most of its credibility. In
view of the uncertainty currently surrounding
the price of gold it would be understood t~at
once a new official price was fixed or a pnce
was agreed between central banks, the Council
would have to take a decision to make
allowance for this new fact.
The balances which the monetary authorities
would be credited with in the accounts of the
Fund would be denominated in ' European
monetary units of account , which would
become a settlement and reserve instrument.
These units would be available for the settle-
ment of positions arising from intervention in
Community currencies, and exchangeable, in
the Fund, for foreign exchange to finance inter-
vention vis-a.-vis third currencies. This unit
of account, since it would become a settlement
and reserve instrument, would be guaranteed
by the Fund, which constitutes a weighty argu-
ment in favour of contributions in gold.
3. Settlement and credit operations in the
Community would be operated through the
Fund, which would be the centre of exchange
relations between Member States.
(a)  As regards settlements, arrangements ~or
credit to finance intervention would be malll-
tained as they stand (no limit on amounts
30 days-end of month). Upon expiry of these
credit arrangements, the debtor central bank
could settle either by a transfer of units of
account in the Fund's books or by transfer of
reserve assets to the Fund;
(b)  In the case of credits, a Bank which did
not wish to made an immediate setdement as
above could make use of the Fund's credit
facilities. In this second case, the Fund would
grant the credit in accordance with the follow-
ing rules:
(i) part of these credits would be used to
create possibilities of clearing within the Fund
and would be granted automatically; they
would be for six months and renewable once;
whenever they were renewed, an examination
would automatically be carried out of the
situation of the debtor country; ceilings on
debts would be fixed at six times the quotas
currently laid down for short-term support ; in
concrete terms, a credit would be granted to a
country by paying units of account into its
account with the Fund;
1 The basic quotas are as follows: Germ~y~ France,
UK: 300 million u.a. each; Italy: 200 mdhon u.
BLEU and Netherlands: 100 million u.a. each; Denmark:
45 million u. ; Ireland: 17.5 million u.
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amount (six times the quotas currently laid
down for short-term support) or duration (six
months, renewable once) would require
recourse to a procedure which would reflect
the purely conditional character of the facilities
granted; this procedure would, to begin with
involve an examination of the economic situa-
tion of the debtor country by the Commis&ion
together with the Monetary Committee,
followed by a decision by the Council. This
decision could lead to the granting of an addi-
tional credit by the Fund or the granting of a
medium-term credit; in both cases the Council
would attach economic policy conditions.
(iii) the rules relating to the utilization of
credit facilities and the ceilings on debts should
be subject to review at a later date, for
instance when the Member States make their
successive contributions to the Fund.
The Commission will make proposals before
the end of the year as regards profits and losses
made by the Fund as a result of changes in the
value of its assets.
If all the proposed measures are to be success-
fully put into effect, the economic policies of
the Me.mber States must be effectively brought
closer togethe.r. If full use is made of all the
various types of coordinating machinery avai-
lable to the Community, it should be possible
to maintain sufficient cohesion between the
economies of the Member States for the pro-
posed monetary organization to operate
harmoniously. In connection with this joint
Community-level application of economic
policy instruments, it would also be necessary,
and, at the same time, easier, to reinforce mea-
sures for the development of a European capi-
tal market. Community cohesion would also
be strengthened if all the Member States were
equipped with sufficiently effective instruments
to ward off inflows of capital from abroad.
In the Commission view, for the ideas
outlined in this document to be given shape
there will be no heed for new institutional
measures to be adopted at the same time.
However, there will have to be a firm political
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will to apply strictly the existing coordinating
mechanisms and new means will be required in
connection with exchange rate policy. The
Commission stressed in its Communication to
the Council of 19 April 1973 on the change-
over to' the second stage that it is not possible to
do without parity adjustment in a monetary
area in the process of being established, but
any adjustments must be made under Commu-
nity control by giving the Community a
watching brief regarding changes in exchange
relationships.
Article 107 of the Treaty of Rome provides
that the Member States must treat their policies
with regard to rates of exchange as a matter of
common concern. It is now a question of
giving concrete form to the application of this
principle.
The utilization of reserves, changes in the
emphasis on the various economic policy
instruments and amendments to exchange rates
are largely interchangeable. Exchange rate
policies governing national currencies, under
the pressure of increasingly heavier constraints
as a result of the growing unity of the econo-
mies and the existence of  Community
exchange rate system, must henceforth allow
for the Community dimensions and not be the
sole responsibility of the Member States.
It should also be stressed that no durable pro-
gress towards Economic and Monetary Union
can be made, and that that Union cannot be
viable, unless the Member States are all bound
by the same. principles as regards exchange
policy.
The main technical aspects of the guidelines set
out in this report are discussed in the Annex.
The Commission proposes to put forward a
series of formal proposals to implement these
guidelines.
The Commissions would like the Council, on
the basis of the proposals which it will make
following this report, to take the necessary
measures to establish the European monetary
system outlined above.Technical  Annex
Monetary organization of the Community
1. The. present Community exchange rate
system consists of elements which were placed
side by side as required by circumstances and
altogether is rather disjointed.
The rules of the Basle Agreement of April 1972
on the practical organization of the Commu-
nity exchange rate system were drawn up and
implemented in a period of major upheavals in
international monetary relations: in less than
three years the relatively narrow (1.5 %)
spread ('tunnel') within which the currencies
may fluctuate against the dollar grew wider
(4.50 %), then disappeared completely after
19 March 1973. The rules of the Agreement
on the narrowing of margins have had to be
frequently adjusted, with respect in particular
to settlements in gold and dollars, and there is
still no sign that this process has come to an
end.
The short-term monetary support mechanism
set up by the Agreement between Central
Banks of 9 February 1970, is based on notions
belonging to the time when the dollar was the
only intervention currency and no concrete
plans existed for the Community to have its
own monetary exchange rate system.
The introduction of the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund in relations that have con-
tinuedon a fundamentally bilateral basis, has
not made the very complex system any simpler.
2. In this respect, the following points
should be made:
(i) Banks accounts are' kept according 
category of maturity corresponding to the set-
tlement date for a given operation, so that a
Central Bank can be in credit with the Fund at
the same time hut with different maturity
dates.
(ii) Clearing, the frequency of which reduces
the size of settlements, is the exception rather
than the rule, for the length of 'interim finan-
cing' is very short and the procedure for provid-
ing short-term monetary support was not
designed with this in mind.
(iii) The arrangement for monetary support
to take over from very short-term facilities is
not well suited to present exchange rate
circumstances.
(iv) Intervention in dollars which was
compulsory under the arrangements applying
prior to 19 March and which today is possible
only after a joint decision, is formally excluded
from the Fund's accounts, although it is of a
Community nature.
(v) Depending on the nature of the opera-
tions, the Fund has had to resort to accounting
techniques involving various types of units of
account in view of the fact that settlements
must be made in proportion to the composition
of the reserves of the debtor country and that
the attraction of these elements varies greatly
according to whether gold, SDRs or dollars are
involved.
3. In calling on the Commission to report
on adjustments to credit arrangements and on
the progressive pooling of reserves, the Council
provided an opportunity to seek means of
reforming the entire system.
It had originally been thought that in the first
stage, arrangements merely had to be made for
one type of credit machinery to take over from
another-very short-term credit facilities being
followed by short-term monetary support
-without modifying their essential characte-
ristics. It had been intended to merge these
two formulas in the second stage and fit them
into one piece. of ' overhauled machinery
Finally, in a later stage, reserves were to be
progressively pooled.
In Part lof this Annex, the problems raised by
the 'adjustment of. credit arrangements' will be
examined. It will ,be .seen that .some of the
diffic~lties .encountered in organizing the pro-
cess whereby one 'credit facility takes over from
S. 12/73another cannot be solved simply by adjusting
credit arrangements. In Part  the technical
details of a progre.ssive pooling of reserves will
be looked at.
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Part I
Adjusting credit arrangements
4. The action to be taken would have to
relate mainly to improving the details of the
arrangement under which short-term monetary
support takes over from very short-term credit.
It would be based on the following principles:
(a)  The provisions of the Basle Agreement
permitting the running up of unlimited debt for
a very short period would be retained.
(b)  When these financing facilities matured
the debtor would have a right to have the
credit extended up to  specific amount and
duration1 but would have to settle in reserve
assets the portion of his debt above this amount.
c)  The credit obtained to this end through
the Fund would in practice be granted by the
initial creditor. In other words, this creditor
would continue to have a claim on the Fund in
a. equivalent to the amount of the credit.
(d)  This claim would rank as a reserve asset
for it would be guaranteed by all participating
central banks and could be mobilized if
needed. This would he done in the following
way:
(i) if the currency of the initial creditor had
in its turn to be supported through intervention
in a Community currency, the resulting indebt-
edness would be set off against the original
claim. A new creditor would take the place
of the initial creditor; he would have the same
rights and obligations as the former.
(ii) in the case of intervention in dollars (sel-
ling), the initial debtor would be free to mobil-
ize his claim on the' Fund against dollars; to
this end, the Fund would be able to draw on
1 The limits on amount and duration could be those
outlined in Part II, Section B II. 2 The credit position in European monetary units of
account (u. ) with the Fund would form an integral
part of the ')fficial reserves of each central bank.credit lines in dollars with the participating
central banks. Use of these credit lines would
give rise to a claim in u.a. on the Fund1
(e)  At fixed dates, for instance on 30 June
and 30 December of each year, the accounts
would be cleared. This lumping together of
maturities, while encouraging clearing, would
put the debtor at a disadvantage where the
period of the credit obtained was not fixed but
varied with the date on which the credit was
taken up.
(I)  To prevent the. credit period being short-
ened in this way, the Fund would ask central
banks able to dos'O to grant ad hoc credits
(i.e. credits with specifically tailored amounts
and periods) permitting settlement with the
creditor on the appointed day and enabling the
credit to the debtor to be maintained until the
normal maturity date.
5. This adjustment would improve the
current system appreciably: the process of one
of the two types of financing taking over from
the other would be more effective, particularly
because it would be automatic up to the ceil-
ings fixed; there would be increased possibili-
ties of clearing, which would reduce the size of
settlements.
6. However, there would still be some
deficiencies:
(i) Adjustment of the credit arrangements
would not eliminate the fundamentally bilate-
ral character of the credit mechanisms.
Though transactions in Community currencies
would have to pass through it, the Fund
would not be a genuine intermediary capable
of ensuring conversion designed to put the rela-
tionships between central banks on a fully
multilateral basis. In the circumstances, the
accounting and settlement methods would
remain complex, and the Fund could not avoid
keeping accounts separate and using a variety
of units of account because of the heterogeneity
of the assets transferred between central banks.
(ii) As the granting of ad hoc credits would
require the assistance of the central banks, the
debtor would have no guarantee of obtaining
the credit for the whole period which he would
normally be entitled to.
(iii) Any intervention in dollars would
remain outside the scope of interim financing,
clearing and settlements, which would be
abnormal in a system under which such inter-
vention must necessarily be based on concerted
action. Given the Community character of the
, decision to which this procedure leads, it
would be equitable to share out the relevant
risks among all participants.
To get round these difficulties, consideration
could be given to setting up a continuous clear-
ing system under which the Fund, drawing on
a 'buffer' formed by its own reserves, would
finance the period between the date for settle~
ment with the creditor and repayment by the
debtors on normal maturity of the credit. But
this technique would be precisely that of pool-
Ing reserves.
It can therefore be seen that from a technical
point of view the pooling of reserves is indis-
pensable. The only question is whether for
non-technical reasons this pooling should
involve successive contributions leading to the
complete pooling of reserves. The main part
of this document sets out reasons which, from
a Community angle, argue for this approach.
Action on the dollar in the form of buying would
continue to be for the party s own account.
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Progr~ssive pooling of reserves
Three questions will be .examined: the choice
of the method for pooling reserves, the advan-
tages of pooling from the ~point of view. 
settlement and credit arrangements and certain
important points connected with this pooling.
A.  Methor;fs  of  pooling reserves
Reserve assets and holdings
of Community currencies
7. The first question is whether it is not only
reserve assets that are to be pooled, but also
holdings of currencies of-the Community coun-
tries. . At .first sight, it could be felt that
handing over to the European Fund large
amounts in currencies of the Member States
was quite natural in a Community enterprise.
Then the Central Bank whose currency
required support would no longer turn directly
to the Central Bqnk. whose currency had
appreciated to obtain the resources necessary to
finance intervention, but to the Fund instead.
Under closer examination, however, this argu-
ment proves to . be weak: it should be recalled
here that the financing of interventions can
under certain circumstances, involve extremely
large sums (in the case of speculative attacks
on a currency , for instance) which exceed the
amounts of national currency which might
have been handed over to the Fund; the Fund
would then have to make a special call on the
creditor central bank. It can then be asked
what. would be gained by setting up such
cumbersome financing mechanisms when use
could be made of those which already exist
and which require each central bank to grant
through the Fund, unlimited credits in its
currency to the partner central banks for a
very short period. Retaining direct financing
S. 12/73
operations betwee.n .central banks in no way
detracts from the Community nature of 
undertaking which would be based on a unit
of account acting as a means of settlement and
a reserve instrument within the Fund.
The idea of supplying the Fund with amounts
in national currencies had also been put
forward to make the overhaul of Community
credit arrangements easier. It will be shown
below that a credit system can operate very
well without contributions in national curren-
cies having to be made to the Fund.
Methods of contributing reserve assets
8. Two separate formulae exist for pooling
reserve assets alone:
(a)  the transfer to the Fund of reserves newly
acquired
(i) from intervention in dollars
(ii) from intervention in Community curren-
CIes.
(b)  the transfer to the Fund, as an initial
contribution, and afterwards at a fixed pace, of
official reserves accumulated in the past in the
form of gold, assets linked to gold and foreign
exchange, mainly dollars.
If the first method alone was chosen, the deci-
sion to pool reserves would, at the beginning,
appear half-hearted, whereas the Fund needs to
be given massive resources if the credit system
it is administering is to operate satisfactorily.
It is probable. that, as regards intervention in
dollars, in a system where such intervention is
no longer systematic, this method would be
slow to take effect and would create inequali-
ties; for example, only countries buying dollars
(non-guaranteed) would transfer these to the
Fund in exchange for units of account (with a
guaranteed va1ue). As regards intervention in
Community currencies, the pace of contribu-
tions would, in the present circumstances, be
less slow and the inequality less marked, for it
can be assumed that there would be a certain
rotation between debtor countries whichwould, in settling up, contribute to the Fund a
range of different reserve assets (gold, assets
linked to gold, dollars) in proportion to the
composition of their reserves.
It can then be seen that even if this method is
necessary for risks that would be involved in
any intervention in dollars to be underwritten
on a Community basis, it would still have
some deficiencies that would have to be made
up by contributing reserves built up previously.
It would be essential to make use of this
second method, for it alone would offer the
possibility of fixing the exact initial contribu-
tions, of making detailed arrangements for
subsequent contributions and of distributing
evenly transfers of reserves to the Fund. It
would also make it possible to set up truly
Community credit machinery. Finally, as it is
being assumed that all reserves will have to be
pooled in the present decade, only with this
method is it possible to do it progressively.
The two methods set out above must therefore
be used together. The following paragraphs
describe how they would be implemented.
Description of the process
for pooling reserves
9.  (a) Settlement of intervention in Com-
munity currencies
Intervention in Community currencies already
involves entries, in units of account, in the
Fund' s books. The central bank which has
lent the currency for this operation has its
account credited and the central bank borrow-
ing the currency has its account debited.
These positions must be settled-by transfer of
reserve assets to the creditor-within short
periods.
Following pooling, the operations would be
effected as follows:
(i) the central bank would receive from the
Fund a credit in monetary units of account as
a final settlement;
(ii) the debtor bank would clear its position
by transferring reserve assets to the Fund.
This settlement would be made:
on the date when the very short-term faci-
lity falls due, or
at a later date if the facility has been
extended by a credit from the Fund, the te.rms
of which are discussed in section B below.
interventions vis-a-vis the (b) Financing
dollar
Normally, any interventions vis-a-vis the dollar
would have a Community character' because
they would influence the position of the
snake
' . 
Financing and bearing the exchange
risks connected with these interventions would
therefore have to be regarded as Community
operations:
(i) the dollars purchased would be handed
back to the Fund against a credit entry in u.
(ii) the dollars sold would be obtained from
the Fund against a debit entry in u.
However, the Board of Governors of the Fund
should remain free to vary application of this
principle in accord,~.nce with circumstances.
In the present situation, a country may for
instance wish to restrict the appreciation of its
currency against the dollar while its partners
would be prepared to let this movement con-
tinue. In this case, the dollars which the coun-
try concerned purchased with the authorization
of the Fund, would be purchased on that coun-
try s own aCCO\lnt; they would not be handed
over to the Fund but would remain with the
central bank making the intervention.
According to the same principle it could be
conceived that a country whose currency
tended to be used as a reserve instrument
could, with the authorization of the Fund, use
its dollar holdings when the balances in its
own currency had been run down.
1 The credit position in European monetary units of
account (u. ) with the Fund is an integral part of
each central bank' s official reserves.
S. 12/73(c) Feeding the Fund through pooling official
reserve holdings
This type of pooling would cover all compo-
nents of official reserves: gold, SDRs, reserve
position in the IMF foreign exchange
holdings.
However certain legal difficulties over the
transfer to the European Fund of reserve posi-
tions in the IMF and of SDRs would have to
be solved beforehand. For the reserve posi-
tions no solution seems in sight at the moment.
As regards the transfer of SDRs, however
one could envisage applying to the IMF for the
European Fund to be given the status of 'other
holder
' .
Ways of calculating the contributions
10.  The contributions of reserve assets can
be made according to two methods: either as a
uniform percentage of the reserves of each cen-
tral bank, or by reference to quotas.
Under the percentage method each central
bank would transfer to the Fund an identical
proportion of its reserves, in successive
tranches. The composition of the contribution
would reflect the share of the individual
reserve assets in the country s total reserves.
The table below shows how this method
would be applied, assuming that reserves worth
11 300 million u. , or about 20 % of all offi-
cial reserves of the Community countries at the
end of March 1973, would be pooled.
Under the quota method each central bank
would pay into the Fund reserve amounts fixed
by reference to its share in the capital of the
Fund. As under the previous method, the
contribution made by each central bank would
be such as to reflect the share of the individual
reserve assets in total national reserves.
A comparaison of the two methods shows that:
(i) the 'identical percentage' method enables
pooling to be staggered without difficulty up to
the end period envisaged for the oper~tior,
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There would be a timetable for the contribu-
tions: they would have to be made at intervals
of 18 months so that each country s total con-
tribution would rise successively to 40 %,
60 %, .etc. of its total reserves at the time
when the contributions were due. The other
method, however, would cause the total
reserves of a given country to be exhausted
before the end of the period, which means that
it could be used for a few years only.
(ii) the quota method provides an automatic
solution to the allocation of risks and gains on
reserves built up previously which have been
pooled; as this allocation would be made in
proportion to the contributions, the .conse-
quence of such 'losses' or 'gains' for a country
would be the same, regardless of whether its
reserves had been pooled or not. This neu-
tral effect would, however, be lessened when
reserves were contributed in connection with
intervention on the foreign exchange markets.
In the light of this comparison, the identical
percentage formula. seems to be the most satis-
factory solution.
At present, and as long as the problem of the
price of gold has not been settled, the contribu-
tion of this reserve asset poses a problem of
evaluation. But it is not advisable to pool
reserves without including gold, for the exer-
cise would then lose most of its credibility.
Consequently, in view of the uncertainty
currently surrounding the price of gold, it
would be understood that once an agreement
was reached at international level or between
the Community Central Banks on the price of
gold, the Council would have to take a deci-
sion to make allowance for this new fact.
Furthermore, a solution would also need to be
found to the matter of allocating the revenue
1 Excluding the small amounts of various currencies
held by the central banks with their correspondents,
amounts which in most cases relate to the role of
Treasury accountant played by the central bank
concerned.
See annexed table on the total level and composition
of Member States' official reserves as at the end of
March 1973.Breakdown~ by country and reserve asset, of a contribution of
11  300 million u.a. made to the Fund in accordance with the
identical percentage' method (20 
1\.s a percentage Contribution As a percentage Contribution 1\.s a percentage
Total of the country
in gold or in of the country in foreign of the country
Country contribution total assets linked relevant exchange relevant
(in mill. u. a. reserves to gold holdings (in !l1i11.  u. a). holdings
(in !l1i11. u. a.
Belgium/Luxembourg 807 502 305
Denmark 178 138
Germany (FR) 251 207 4044
France 1 854 912 942
Ireland 173 155
Italy 037 711 326
Netherlands 999 619 380
United Kingdom 001 294 707
Composition of Fund' holdings 11 300 100 4303 38. 997 61.9
Breakdown, by country and reserve asset, of a contribution of
11  300 million u.a. made to the Fund in accordance with the
quota method1
As a percentage Contribution As a percentage Contribution 1\.s a percentage
Total of the country in gold or in of the country in foreign of the country
Country contribution total assets linked relevant exchange relev.ant
(in !l1i11. u. a. reserves to gold holdings (iu mill. u. a. holdings
(in mill. 11. a.
Belgium/Luxembourg 829 20. 516 20. 313 20.
Denmark 373 41.8 41.8 289 41.8
Germany (FR) 2488 572 1 916
France 2488 26. 223 26. 1 265 26.
Ireland 145 16. 16. 130 16.
Italy 659 32. 138 32. 521 32.
Netherlands 829 16. 513 16. 316 16.
United Kingdom 2488 49. 730 49. 1 758 49.
Composition of Fund's holdings 11 299 100 4791 42.4 6 508 57.
(1) Rounded figures.
S. 12/73Credit ceiling for each country
(u.a. millions)
Belgium! 
Luxembourg
I Germany 
(FR) I France Italy
600 270 1 800 1 800 105 1 200 600 1 800
Denmark
earned by the Fund from the investment of the
transferred reserve assets. This problem bears
no resemblance to that of possible exchange
rates gains. It is proposed that this revenue
should be allocated to the central banks in
proportion to the participation of each
Member State in the capital of the Fund.
B.  Community settlement
and credit arrangements following
the progressive pooling  of  reserves
General principles
11. By pooling reserves it would be possible
to strip the settlement and intra-Community
credit machinery of the bilateral characteristics
that remain attached to it-even after the over-
haul-and the shortcomings of which were
mentioned above.
After pooling, the Fund would no longer be an
intermediary' institution through which settle-
ment and credit operations between the
Member States pass, but would become the
organ which itself settled up with the creditor
and lent to the debtor.
The following machinery is envisaged here:
(i) Very short-term financing (30 days from
the end of the month in which the credit is
granted) would continue as at present;
(ii) Far-reaching changes would he made in
short-term credit arrangements, as regards the
amounts involved, the duration of the credit
and the conditions under which it was granted.
There should be no link between the amount
S. 12/73
Ireland Netherlands I
United
Kingdom
of reserves contributed and the ceiling fixed.
If the percentage method was used for the
pooling, such a link would have undesirable
results, for countries of comparable economic
size would end with vastly differing credit
possibilities.
Taking into account firstly the amounts and
the duration of credits likely to improve possi-
bilities of using clearing in the Community
exchange rate system, and, secondly, 'reason-
able' levels of indebtedness, ceilings could 
fixed at six times the' quotas granted the
Member States under the short-term monetary
support mechanism. These ceilings could be
adjusted later. The table above gives the
. amounts proposed.
Credit up to the above ceilings would be
granted automatically for a period of six
months with the possibility of being renewed
once. Any renewal would result automatically
in the situation of the debtor country being
examined. Where credit needs exceed the
limits on amount or duration, a procedure
would have to be used which reflected the
strictly conditional character of the facilities
granted.
Method of implementation
12. The Fund's accounting procedure would
need to distinguish between the u.a. obtained
1 The short-term monetary support quotas are as
follows: Germany, France, United Kingdom: 300 mil-
lion U.a. each; Italy: 200 million u.a.; BLEU and
Netherlands: 100 million u.a. each; Denmark 45 mil-
lion u.a. and Ireland: 17.5 million U.against reserves handed over and the u.a. repre-
senting credits obtained. A country should be
able to obtain credit even before it has begun to
draw on its reserves, including its holdings in
a. For operational reasons it would be advis-
able to record separately the various types of
credits a country had received.
Each central bank would thus have three sepa-
rate accounts with the Fund:
(i) a 'reserve' account with an  initial credit
entry corresponding to the reserves contributed;
(ii) a 'very short-term financing' account on
which the amounts necessary for support inter-
vention would be debited;
(iii) a 'short-term credit account' recording
the short-term credits received from the Fund.
Thus, when intervention is made in Commu-
nity currencies', the Fund would record the
operations in the various accounts as follows:
(a)  The Fund would settle up immediately
with the central bank providing the hard curren-
cy by crediting its reserve account with the
equivalent, in u. , of the amount of its curren-
cy sold when intervening.
(b)  The Fund would debit the same amount
to the 'very short-term financing' account of
the central bank whose currency was
supported. At the present time there is no
ceiling on this type of finance, but the position
must be cleared by the debtor central bank at
the end of the period agreed (end of month,
30 days). This would be done by the follow-
ing methods, used separately or jointly:
(i) debiting the reserve account with the
Fund;
(ii) handing over reserve assets not yet trans-
ferred to the Fund, in proportion to their rela-
tive share in the debtor s total reserves;
(iii) having short-term credit take over from
very short-term finance up to the amounts
available under this head.
C.  Points connected with the pooling
of reserves
13. Two major points deserve to be men-
tioned in connection with the new stage in the
monetary organization of the EEC.
Capital of the Fund
Under the proposals set out in this document,
the Fund, a legal personality, takes on a major
monetary role. The Fund should be provided
with its own capital to mark this stage.
This capital, amounting to 500 million U.
would be subscribed in Community currencies
from the Member States' budgets. This capital
would be apportioned between the Member
States in accordance wih the scale fixed for
short-term monetary support' and could be
paid up in successive tranches, for insistance at
the same pace as reserves are pooled.
Giving the Fund its own capital could enable it
to finance its operating expenditure from reve-
nue obtained from the investment of its re-
sources. Futhermore, this capital could be used
as the scale for allocating the revenue earned
from the joint management of the reserve assets.
Larger role for the European monetary unit
of account
The instrument used for the pooling of reserves
would be the European monetary unit of
account (EMUA), a definition of which was
given in Article 5 of the Statutes of the Euro-
pean Fund. This unit would not only serve for
keeping the accounts on the Fund's operations
but would also become a payment and reserve
instrument.
Against this background it must be asked
whether or not the present definition of this unit
of account should be reviewed. Here, the idea
is sometimes floated that the value of this instru-
S. 12/73ment should be defined on the basis of the
currencies of the participating countries. This
would mean linking the value and adjustments
in the value of this unit mainly to the value of
the component currencies rather than to mone-
taryevents outside the Community.
Level and composition of the official reserves of the countries
of the European Community
(situation .as at the end of March 1973)
Total reserves Holdings in gold or in assets linked to gold Holdings in foreign exchange
Country As a
As a percentage Asa percentage
of the reserves of of the reserves of
Amount percentage Amount Amount
(in mill. u. a. of EC (in mill. u.
The country! The EC
(in mill. u. a.
The cOtmtry I reserves The EC
Belgium/Luxembourg 4034 2 512 62. 11.7 1 522 37. 4.4
Denmark 892 1.6 200 22. 692 77.
Germany (FR) 26 255 46. 6034 23. 28. 20 221 77. 57.
France 9269 16.4 4558 49. 21.2 4711 50. 13.
Ireland 867 1.5 10. 0.4 776 89.
Italy 5 182 3 554 68. 16. 1 628 31.4
Netherlands 4995 3 093 61.9 14.4 1 902 38. 5.4
United Kingdom 5003 1 467 29. 3 536 70. 10.
Community 56 497 100 21 509 38. 100 34 988 61.9 100
(1) 1 u.a. = 0.888671 g of fine gold = 1.20635 US $.
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